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


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Maintaining Warfighting Skills While Keeping the Peace in Bosnia

**By CPT Robert Murphy, CPT Fred Johnson,
SFC Barry Tankersley, and SSG John Shaw**

"Effective Training is the number one priority of senior leaders in peacetime. In wartime, training continues with a priority second only to combat or to the support of combat operations."

-- FM 25-100, Training the Force

Task Force Eagle (TFE) developed a strategy for training while enforcing the peace in the former Yugoslavia. This document provides the framework for that training strategy with particular emphasis on how battalion-sized units maintained *Warfighting Skills*. This is not a definitive work. At publication, TFE was midway in its year-long mission. However, it does provide an overview of TFE's approach to implementing training and some of the obstacles that were faced. It also provides some tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) developed to overcome those obstacles. It is a startpoint for units throughout the Army from which they can begin to plan training while employing.



The Obstacles of Training While Employing

The initial focus of the deployment of TFE into Bosnia was to first move into the area of responsibility, separate the warring factions and establish the zone of separation. The Division training officers were involved in planning the deployment and performing duties as members of the Assault Command Post. It was not until the implementation of the General Framework for Peace was well underway that the Task Force could begin to plan training.

As the training strategy developed, constraints were identified:

☛ **The Mission came first. TFE had to train while employing.**

☛ **Force protection requirements limited the area available to train.**

☛ **The operational mission and decentralized nature of the operation in the area of responsibility limited collective training opportunities.**

☛ **Many training assets/aids were not available to the units.**

☛ **Training guidance was not issued until D+120 because of operational requirements.**

☛ **Training doctrine does not fully address the implications and factors associated with the conduct of training simultaneous to performing a prolonged operation.**

A Reminder!

If you have articles and lessons of interest to the Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/9567 or DSN 552-3035/9567; FAX DSN 552-9564.

DISCLAIMER

This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product and is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. The information and lessons herein have not been staffed, but are the perceptions of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities and real-world events. The intent is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner.

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Our E-mail address is:

call@leav-emh1.army.mil

Our WWW home page is:

<http://call.army.mil:1100/call.html>

THE EDITORIAL STAFF

Director, CALL - COL Edward J. Fitzgerald III

Managing Editor - Dr. Lon R. Seglie

Editor plus Layout and Design -

Mary Sue Winneke

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Nevertheless, Field Manuals 25-100 and 25-101 were the cornerstone documents for training management and developing the training strategy. Because TFE had entered the sustainment phase of the operation, U.S. training doctrine could be applied in a broad context. TFE essentially took what doctrine presented for peacetime training and adjusted it to the operational environment. Nonetheless, the planning and execution of training required manipulation of the doctrine to correspond with the METT-T conditions.

Shortly after the 120-day mark of the deployment, the TFE Commander published his training guidance. Within this succinct 470-word document, the Commander provided the framework for the conduct of training while executing peace operations.

The guidance concentrated on the sustainment of basic combat skills and on mission-essential tasks, while ensuring successful completion of the mission. The Commander established four focused training objectives for TFE. These objectives were:

- **Battle Command/Staff Training**
- **Warfighting Skills**
- **Leader Training**
- **Training Management**

The endstate requirement was two-fold: A highly successful completion of the IFOR mission and development of an accurate unit assessment prior to redeployment. This assessment would become the basis for the follow-on mission training plans.

Maintaining Warfighting Skills

“Train on the basic war fighting skills based on CTT requirements, MOS specific, and collective warfighting tasks. Units will focus on individual, squad/crew and platoon-level operations using the principles established in the listed references. Again, troop-leading procedures to include rehearsals and PCIs as well as battle drills must be emphasized.”

-- From MG Nash's Training Guidance

The training conducted during the operation had essentially two audiences: soldiers and leaders who deployed into Bosnia from the start and those soldiers and leaders who arrived into theater after the initial deployment.

The first group underwent an extensive trainup during Mountain Eagle in Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels, Germany. Members of the second group that were stationed in Germany or elsewhere in Europe and deployed were required to conduct certification training at Hohenfels before they were allowed to enter the theater. The remaining members of the second group deployed from the U.S. and received an orientation at Fort Benning, GA, prior to deploying to Germany where they had to conduct the certification training at Hohenfels before being allowed to enter the operational area.

Training New Arrivals. Training the new arrivals relied on the experiences of the veterans. These

experiences were captured through a detailed after-action review process that was conducted by every unit down to squad level. In addition, the Center for Army Lessons Learned published a “lesson learned” every 72 hours which was disseminated down to platoon level. From this collective experience and other individual training requirements, battalions developed “New Soldier” training programs.

A squadron within the task force instituted the new soldier training plan shown here. The plan was flexible to add new information that developed during the deployment. Each soldier received the following training information. All new soldier training was complete within the first 24 hours after arriving at the final assignment. After the initial training, the new soldier continued to work with experienced soldiers to continue to train and sustain skills to support the daily operation.



SQUADRON - - WITHIN 24 HOURS OF ARRIVAL

- Welcome
- Location of Subordinate Units
- Squadron's Mission
- Squadron's Task Organization
- Squadron's Chain of Command
- Troop Assignment

TROOP - - WITHIN 24 HOURS OF ASSIGNMENT

● Location of Assigned Unit in Relation to Others

- Inprocess and Assign to a Platoon
- Update ROE
- Read all Lessons Learned
- Read all Current Division, Brigade, and Squadron Policies

- Read General Order No. 1
- Receive Mine Awareness Update
- Take NCO Certification (leader) Test

(E-5 - E-7) (within 30 days)

- Receive Troop Mission
- Receive Troop Task Organization
- Issue and Account for Ammunition
- Conduct TA-50 Shakedown
- Receive and Pass PMCS Verification

● Offer Soldier Tick-borne Encephalitis Shot

Coupled with the New Soldier training program, squad drills were used to integrate new soldiers into the unit. The "right seat" and "buddy" programs ensured that a seasoned soldier helped train new soldiers in individual and crew skills.

Individual and Collective Task Training. Once the new arrivals received their orientation training, they were better prepared to participate in the individual and collective training. Units practiced mission skills on a daily basis. Doing the mission right, by the published standards and performance measures, was training. However, the "heart" of the training was in the after-action review. Although not a new idea, TFE made the after-action review process an integral aspect of operations. Missions were not allowed to become routine and repetitious. Leadership within the units used daily missions to practice mission preparation and reinforce individual, crew and collective skills. When soldiers mastered basic skills, they were cross-trained in other MOS skills.

"What I am selling to everyone, and it's a lesson learned, is that I am thoroughly convinced that our success is directly proportional to our credibility and proficiency at warfighting. The environment has some differences, yes, but the differences are more tactics, techniques and procedures than doctrine . . . the thing to remember is that we are warfighters."

-- MG Nash, TFE Commander

NCOs trained individual and crew skills at the checkpoints and in the base camps. The skills were used during day-to-day operations. Platoon collective training was conducted when possible during the daily operations. All training was reviewed in an informal AAR to ensure that lessons learned were addressed. Retraining was conducted prior to and during the next mission. Leaders at all levels practiced troop-leading procedures. Rehearsals and pre-combat inspections were used to ensure soldiers did not become complacent when executing a recurring mission.

Daily missions required training in a number of skills that were applicable to the mission and also crossed over into traditional warfighting skills. Units identified missions where embedded tasks were similar to collective tasks on the unit's Mission Essential Task List. For example, the tasks associated with establishing and operating an observation post is similar to that of establishing a battle position and establishing and operating a checkpoint is similar to constructing a strongpoint.



Individual Weapon and Gunnery Training.

Possibly the most degradable of all skills in any unit is marksmanship and gunnery. There were three components of marksmanship and gunnery training: Individual weapons training, Pre-gunnery training, and Gunnery. Small arms ranges were constructed in the base camps and surrounding areas that were accessible to the units. Micro-gunnery and pre-gunnery training also took place in base camps and at checkpoints. An artillery and attack helicopter range was constructed in Glamoc, Bosnia, in the western portion of the country in the British sector. Tank and Bradley gunnery, along with some small unit maneuver live-fire training, was conducted in Taborfalva, Hungary.

Individual Weapon Training. Twenty-four small arms ranges were constructed in Bosnia. These ranges could accommodate M9, M16, M249, M60, and caliber .50 firing. Before construction of ranges could begin, the following requirements had to be met:

- **Units had to conduct a risk assessment on the development and operation of the range.**
- **Unit civil affairs teams had to coordinate with local authorities for land use.**
- **Potential training areas and access to the areas had to be cleared and proofed of mines and unexploded ordnance.**
- **The proposed design of the range had to be submitted to G3 Training and the Division Safety Office for approval. Division Safety would evaluate the plan on the ground and certify it for firing.**
- **All ranges required a surface danger area analysis to ensure safe conduct of the range. The analysis had to take into account, but was not limited to, the maximum range of the weapon to be fired and “ricochet danger area” as a potential hazard to populated areas. The standard for the surface danger area analysis was found in AR 385-63.**
- **Upon approval, units could begin to construct the range. In addition, on-call restricted overfly zones had to be developed for the ranges.**

Pre-Gunnery Training. As weaknesses in pre-gunnery skills became apparent, TFE turned to its master

gunners to sustain and teach gunnery skills in theater. Many master gunners had other primary jobs as staff NCOs due to the requirements of continuous operations. However, master gunners found the time to develop sustainment gunnery plans using a walk-crawl-run method and USAREUR's eight-step training model as a guide. Individual tasks were taught first. Leader tasks were taught next and finally collective tasks. As standards were met, conditions and level of difficulty were increased. Of particular interest is the way master gunners integrated Tank Weapons Gunnery Simulation System/Precision Gunnery System (TWGSS/PGS) in Tank Crew Proficiency Courses (TCPCs) and Bradley Crew Proficiency Courses (BCPCs).


TCPC/BCPC courses built-in sector allowed the Bradley and Tank crews to exercise pre-gunnery skill prior to deployment to Taborfalva Training Area (TTA) in Taborfalva, Hungary. The TCPC/BCPC courses were built to evaluate the training conducted in sector. The courses were built by soldiers using scale targets. The Task Force fielded the TWGSS/PGS during the deployment after some units had qualified at TTA. The units that received TWGSS/PGS systems improved in fire commands and crew tasks during gunnery qualification.

The development of ranges and courses in or near the unit base camps was a considerable effort. Unit master gunners developed the range plans and standards needed to prepare the course. The course design was limited by the available training space. Design concerns centered on the course scale, target-size presentation techniques and course speed. The result was an effective scaled course that depicted target scenarios closely resembling the actual gunnery range. An example of initiative used by one master gunner to create a makeshift BCPC that could be used by crews from his unit is worth note. Near the base camp, a unit had little space that could be dedicated for use as a BCPC. The unit Master Gunner realized that a stretch of road not far from the base camp was free of mines and was infrequently used by the local civilians. He coordinated for engineers to grade the road surface and push earth under his supervision to create “battle positions.” On each side of the road were numerous tree lines. In lieu of target lifters, full-scale targets were placed on opposite sides of the tree lines of the BFV direction of travel.




Therefore, the BFV would come face to face with the target it was to engage. The master gunner would evaluate the engagement. This BCPC was approximately two miles long and had 12 engagements. The unit Master

Gunner had the option to reposition the targets, allowing him to increase the desired level of difficulty for crews that had already met the standard on previous runs.



A problem encountered during course development was the availability of target lifters. Infantry lifters were used to present scaled targets, when available and fixed, or stationary targets were used on courses that did not have access to lifters. Units that were issued target lifters received the Single Infantry Target lifters. These were the only type of target lifters that were available for issue. Tank unit master gunners, realizing the infantry lifters would not be sufficiently powered to lift one-half scale

tank targets, constructed lighter targets from available resources. They constructed cardboard targets to compensate for the weight difference of the different targets. The targets were not as durable due to weather and wind, but were sufficient to conduct training. Other unit master gunners did not use the infantry target lifters at all. They constructed makeshift targets from available resources. An example of one master gunner's makeshift targets is shown below.






A tank platoon operating a checkpoint in the Zone of Separation had very little available terrain and no training devices with which to work. However, it was able to conduct gunnery training by building a mini-range out of on-hand materials. The master gunner fabricated targets out of MRE boxes and affixed them to a 2x4. A string was added to raise the target and a rubber band attached to the back allowed the target to fall. Later, reverse polarity thermal paper was added to the targets to provide thermal training.

To add a moving target scenario, a track was designed from a 4x4 and 1x4s were nailed together to fit over the track. A string was added to provide movement.

The type of training provided by the master gunner wasn't published in any field manual; it was from his own personal experience and imagination. Not everyone possesses these traits and, therefore, may be falling short in providing opportunity training for their unit.





Units knew they would have problems with crew stability and gunnery resources. They used established training practices and applied them to pre-gunnery training in sector.

- Sandtables/terrain boards were used to familiarize crews with range requirements.
- Engagement techniques were taught using the sandtables/terrain boards as a teaching tool.
- Tank and Bradley Crew Proficiency Courses (TCPCs/BCPCs) were established near main camps and included in daily operations. Placement of the ranges allowed some units to access them without leaving the lodgment areas. Some units built dedicated ranges in protected areas to allow the units to include the range training as a part of the daily operations.
- Units used reverse polarity paper to familiarize crews with thermal target signature prior to moving to TTA.

Many units conducted an in-depth pre-gunnery trainup prior to qualification at TTA. This trainup was usually conducted approximately two weeks prior to qualification.

Most units used a sustainment gunnery plan that was written by the battalion S3 and Master Gunner. This gunnery plan was distributed down to company level where the unit could tailor the plan to fit the company's specific mission. The plan normally consisted of numerous classes on preliminary gunnery subjects such as target acquisition, engagement techniques, fire commands, and misfire procedures. Upon completion of the classes, the unit conducted a BCPC/TCPC and a diagnostic and record BGST/TGST. During the BCPC/TCPC, the tasks that were evaluated included gun lay, tracking, fire commands, engagement techniques, berm drills (driving techniques), shooting in a simulated NBC environment, thermal sight usage, range determination, and target (fire) adjustment. Upon completion of the TCPC/BCPC, the battalion and company master gunners determined which crews were not as strong as other crews in their crew skills. These crews (usually the newer crews) were identified and sent to TTA with the advance party to utilize the Mobile-Conduct of Fire Trainer (M-COFT).

This gave each of the weaker crews at least 10 hours of additional training prior to qualification. The next company that was scheduled to qualify at TTA was given priority on the battalion's training resources to include TWGSS/PGS, classrooms, and the TCPC/BCPC.

During training, several lessons learned were identified:

- ✓ Units that did not get TWGSS/PGS prior to pre-gunnery needed more time to adjust to the training in TTA.
- ✓ Tracking (snake) boards were not available in some units.
- ✓ Lack of target lifters. Infantry lifters were used for scaled ranges in sector when available.
- ✓ Limited target acquisition/scanning opportunities.
- ✓ Master Gunners performed primary duties in the operations cell and the tactical operations center which limited their ability to focus on training.
- ✓ The units changed to the new FM 23-1, *Bradley Gunnery*, standards after they deployed to the area of operations.

In the future, deploying units should consider the following when developing their pre-gunnery training plan:

- ✓ Build snake boards using available materials to develop tracking skills and turret control techniques. If materials for boards are not available, units can track the silhouette of a building, vehicle, or horizon/terrain feature. The gunner evaluates the TC/BC skills and the TC evaluates gunner skills.
- ✓ Place fixed targets at angles that require crews to scan from different locations on the range to acquire targets. This technique places targets at an oblique angle to some engagements in order not to crowd the engagement area.
- ✓ Scale targets and target silhouettes should be used when available. Micro-armor and scale targets should be ordered through the supply system/TASC. If unavailable, units can rough out silhouettes using available materials.



Gunnery Training. The gunnery program that was originally established at TTA was for company/troop sized units to rotate through an eight-day training cycle. Day one was devoted to travel to the TTA. Day two consisted of equipment draw, set up of training devices and the conduct of TCPC/BCPC. Days three and four were devoted to Table VIII qualification. Day five was devoted to requalification, maintenance, and equipment turn-in. A two-day (day six and seven) R&R was then taken by the unit. Day eight was devoted to travel back to the AOR. Later the training rotation was changed. Tables XI and XII were added in lieu of the two days of R&R. This enabled leaders to train platoons by maneuvering in a tactical environment. This also gave the commander an assessment of the company's training status before deployment back to the AOR or home station.

The 7th Army Training Command (7ATC) provided the personnel to build and run the range and the support facilities to house and sustain the units. Crew evaluators are trained by 7ATC and have experience at Grafenwöhr evaluating gunnery skills during qualification. The range is on a leased Hungarian military training facility located approximately 60 kilometers southeast of Budapest. It consists of a life support area/administrative area, a small arms range, a maneuver area, an artillery firing area, a maneuver range and a small artillery impact area. The

range is capable of supporting up to Tank and Bradley Table XII and Artillery Table VI.

The range consists of a live-fire maneuver range, a range tower, a range operations center, a VIP shelter, an After-Action Review (AAR) facility and two GP medium tents with wooden floors set up for the training unit's command post, warm-up tent and dining facility for those soldiers fed on the range. An M16, M9, M240 and Infantry Squad Assault Course is located on the left most portion of the range. The live fire maneuver range will support up to a Table XII. Tanks and Bradleys will fire only training ammunition. TFE units fired through Table VIII.

The layout of the TTA gunnery range is wider than the ranges used for crew qualification at Grafenwöhr. Crews must use integrated target acquisition procedures to acquire targets during gunnery. One of the trends observed during crew qualification training is that crews are having difficulty acquiring targets on the range. The TTA ranges also have realistic clutter that requires the crews to exercise scanning techniques to acquire. No intermediate tables (Tables V, VI, VII) were fired at TTA. Units that fired Table XII performed poorly on engagements requiring the special gunnery techniques that intermediate tables provide. Engagements that were conducted with a fully operational fire control system and employing only one weapons system at a time did not seem to pose a problem to crews.

Conclusion

"The impact of sustained operations should be, for our junior leaders, a career-defining experience that internalizes into their professional souls the lessons of doing things right. We must take advantage of this unique opportunity to create a cadre of professional soldiers that are able to sustain operations to standard and have the moral courage to do what is right all the time."

-- From MG Nash's Training Guidance



In peace operations, and particularly during peace enforcement missions, units must be capable of transitioning to war rapidly. Maintaining warfighting skills while enforcing the peace requires leaders who understand our training doctrine and can apply that doctrine in an austere environment. It also requires discipline and innovation. With this in mind, there are many lessons that have been “internalized” by the leaders of TFE. These lessons stand as examples of “training while employing.”

- ☛ **Some time must be dedicated to planning and resourcing training prior to deployment.**
- ☛ **Leaders must identify the obstacles to training while employing and develop plans to reduce the distractors to training.**
- ☛ **Field Manuals 25-100 and 25-101 must be the foundation for planning the training.**
- ☛ **A plan for training new arrivals must be developed and implemented.**

Because of limited maneuver areas and mission requirements, training will have to be conducted at checkpoints and other mission-related locations. This will require leaders to develop plans to ensure both the training and mission are conducted to standard.

For heavy units, master gunners are the key to successful preparation and execution of training. They must be freed of additional duties to allow them to focus on their training mission. For other units, NCOs must be designated to fulfill the same mission.

Ranges require substantial coordination and resources, to include contracting local areas for use (these areas may have to be cleared of mines). Nonetheless, soldiers must maintain their marksmanship skills. Planners should remember to forecast and load plan targetry aids for deployments. If targetry aids and simulators are not available, trainers must be innovative.

The after-action review is the key to training. The results of the AAR should be documented and disseminated throughout the task force.☛

SYNCHRONIZING THE RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISTURBANCES (TASK FORCE EAGLE'S STAFF COORDINATION)

by CPT Fred Johnson, CALL OPSO, Bosnia

The Division staff coordinated resources to be employed by the brigades prior to potential civil disturbances in a process called the “Counter-Demonstration Workgroup.” The Counter-Demonstration Workgroup consisted of the following staff and special staff personnel:

- ✓ G3
- ✓ G2
- ✓ PMO
- ✓ MCR (PSYOP)
- ✓ CA

- ✓ JMC
- ✓ PAO
- ✓ A²C²
- ✓ G5
- ✓ Chaplain

- ✓ DIV ENG
- ✓ DIV Surgeon
- ✓ FSE
- ✓ G6

A close look at the organization of the Counter-Demonstration Workgroup reveals the emergence of some nontraditional staff proponencies. The Public Affairs Office (under the umbrella of Informations Operations), Provost Marshall's Office, Joint Military Commission, and the Political Advisor all played key, if not decisive, roles in counter-demonstration operations.



PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS:

The Public Affairs Office and Information Operations ensured that Task Force Eagle beat the factions to the media with the correct information before the factions could launch a propaganda campaign of biased or erroneous press reports.

This lesson was learned after an incident at Dobož where helicopters were used to separate two hostile crowds and over 100 warning shots were fired. The next day the Bosnian Serb press incorrectly printed that two people were shot and over a dozen people were hospitalized from the debris sprayed by the helicopter rotor wash.

TTP: Through the Counter-Demonstration Workgroup, the actions of both Public Affairs Office and Information Operations were coordinated well before a scheduled event. A spokesperson was identified, and a news release was drafted. Several days before the event, the news release would be issued, radio broadcasts would be played on the Armed Forces Network, and a press advisory would be issued to legitimate local, national, and international media agencies about the upcoming event. Brigade Commanders also had talk shows on local radio stations where they would discuss the event and the roles and responsibilities of the civil authorities and civilians. During the execution phase, the key to gaining an accurate account of the event was single-source reporting. The units on the ground would render their reports to their higher headquarters. Reports would be passed up the chain ultimately reaching the Task Force Eagle battle captain. The battle captain would then pass the information to the Public Affairs representative in the Division tactical operation center. The PAO representative would then draft a news release which would be submitted to the Joint Information Bureau for approval. The news release would then be disseminated to the local, national, and international media. After the event, the spokesperson would be available to answer questions.

JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION:

The mission of the Joint Military Commission at Division level and below included disseminating policy, issuing instructions to factions on policies and procedures, coordinating the General Framework Agreement for Peace required actions, resolving military complaints, questions and problems, coordinating civil/military actions where appropriate, and developing confidence-building measures between parties.

TTP: The Joint Military Commission coordinated with the former warring factions prior to a scheduled event. In addition, input was provided for fragmentary orders directing brigades to conduct joint military commissions and bilateral meetings with the former warring factions. Division-level joint military commissions and bilateral meetings were conducted and letters, outlining Task Force Eagle's intentions and expectations signed by the Division Commander, were sent to corps-level commanders of the former warring factions. Finally, during the last few days before the event, joint commission officers ensured communications were established between the Division Headquarters and the headquarters of the former warring factions.



POLITICAL ADVISOR:

The influence of the political advisor on Task Force Eagle counter-demonstration operations was significant.

TTP: Several weeks prior to a scheduled event, the political advisor would conduct an assessment and disseminate his findings throughout the staff. He would orchestrate civil military seminars and bilateral meetings and coordinate with national authorities. Several days prior to the event, he would visit the local authorities.

PROVOST MARSHALL'S OFFICE:

TTP: The Provost Marshall's Office was the initial link of Task Force Eagle to the International Police Task Force. During the planning phase, the Provost Marshall's Office would provide a formal letter to the Tuzla Regional Headquarters of the International Police Task Force notifying them of the event. The PMO would request that the International Police Task Force coordinate with the Brigades and the local police. From this coordination, the type of assistance required from Task Force Eagle would be identified. It must be underscored that the International Police Task Force's charter does not include actual intervention - - their primary role is to monitor, observe, and inspect law enforcement agencies and to advise the agencies of threats to peace. During the preparation and execution phase, the Provost Marshall's Office would continue the coordination, ensuring that good communications were maintained with the International Police Task Force. Finally, the International Police Task Force was requested to submit a report to the Provost Marshall's Office 72 hours after the event.

The collective efforts of the nontraditional staff and traditional staff agencies were coordinated during the Counter-Demonstration Workgroup meeting which was usually held weekly.

TTP: The G3 chaired the meeting and began with the G2 representative briefing and update on the future Inter-Entity Boundary Line crossings and potential demonstration sites. The G2 used a briefing slide of the area of responsibility with the location of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line crossings and demonstration sites. It was color-coded to display the likelihood of the event occurring: Red - - highly likely; Yellow - - unconfirmed; Green - - not likely/canceled. The slide described the event, the faction, the organizer of the event, and the route of movement.

The G3 followed the G2 in the briefing sequence. The G3 briefed the subordinate brigade's concept of operation and scheme of maneuver as it pertained to each event. The G3 then tasked each member of the group to complete his portion of a synchronization matrix that had to be finalized the night before the event.



TTP: The synchronization matrix was complimented by a contingency plan. The contingency plan outlined the specific responsibilities of each member of the group starting two weeks before the planned event. The following is an example of a portion of the contingency plan for PSYOP.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

D-14	D-13	D-12	D-11	D-10	D-9	D-8	D-7
Coordinate PSYOP assessments in BDE AOR. Begin assessments.	ID accessibility and susceptibility of target audience.	Develop products concepts based on I/O and BDE input.	Present products to battle update. Adjust products.	Fwd approved products to ARRC (Corps) for final approval and production.		ID PSYOP teams for QRF	

D-6	D-5	D-4	D-3	D-2	D-1	D-Day	D+3
	Begin high visibility PSYOP appearance. PSYOP dissemination window opens.		Update PSYOP assessment. Pre-position TPTs in BDE areas.	Preposition GS tactical assets (TPT). Preposition tactical PSYOP assets (TPT).	Deploy additional GS TPTs as required by the BDE CDR. Prep Aerial Loudspeaker (ALS) for potential msn.	Deploy ALS as required.	Submit info for articles. Conduct post test.

TTP: The conditions for the rapid buildup of forces and resources were set through the efforts of the Counter-Demonstration Workgroup. Nevertheless, when those assets were needed, a system had to be in place to ensure effective command and control. The Battle “Captain’s Incident Drill” facilitated this process. For civil disturbances, the drill would be initiated when the brigade at the site reported that a confrontation between the groups has occurred or is likely to occur (e.g., shots fired, rock-throwing, etc.). The battle captain then would alert the tactical operations center and the command group (CG and Assistant Division Commanders for Maneuver and Support). The respective staff agencies would assemble and the battle captain would conduct a “huddle” where information was compiled in the following format:



BATTLE CAPTAIN'S INCIDENT DRILL

INCIDENT: _____ DTG: _____ SECTOR/UNIT: _____ LOCATION: _____

- ALERT TENT
- ALERT CMD GP: CG ___ ADC-M ___ CofS ___
- HUDDLE:

- BATTLE CPT
 - UPDATE SITUATION MAP
 - BDE BATTLE CPT SITREP

TROOPS AVAILABLE - OIC _____

TF EAGLE ASSETS AVAILABLE _____

FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS _____

- G-2
 - INTEL UPDATE
 - REVIEW & UPDATE TGT BOARD

TF EAGLE ASSETS AVAILABLE _____

FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS _____

- BDE LO
 - RPT ON BDE ASSETS/PLAN
- A2C2
 - AVAILABLE ASSETS/DIVERT OR TTL

TF EAGLE ASSETS AVAILABLE _____

FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS _____

- PMO
 - IPTF/CIVIL POLICE (BDE LEVEL)
 - REQUIRED IPTF/CIVIL POLICE (TF LEVEL)

TROOPS AVAILABLE ON SITE - OIC _____

TF EAGLE ASSETS AVAILABLE _____

OFFICIALS ON SITE _____

OFFICIALS NOTIFIED _____

FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS _____

- JMC
 - SR FACTION MILITARY LEADERS NOTIFIED

FWF HQ NOTIFIED _____

FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS _____

- CA
 - LOCAL MAYOR/CIVIL OFFICIALS (BDE LEVEL)
 - AREA OFFICIALS (TF LEVEL)

TF EAGLE ASSETS AVAILABLE _____

OFFICIALS ON SITE _____

OFFICIALS NOTIFIED _____

FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS _____

- PSYOP
 - TEAMS AVAILABLE & STATUS
 - EQUIPMENT/ASSETS AVAILABLE
 - THEMES/ISSUE

TROOPS AVAILABLE/ON SITE - OIC _____

TF EAGLE ASSETS AVAILABLE _____

FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS _____

- UPDATE TENT
- UPDATE CMD GP
- ★ CMD GP DECISION _____

NOTES: _____



TTP: The priority information requirements (PIR) compiled by the G2 and disseminated at the Counter Demonstration Workgroup meeting were answered by the staff proponenty during the incident drill. An example of the PIRs for PSYOP included the following:

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

1. How many people are present in the group or groups?

2. What is the gender makeup (male/female), age range; are there children present?

3. How are they moving (foot or vehicle)?

4. What is the general attitude of the people (violent or peaceful)?

5. Is there a key speaker, instigator or

group representative, and if so, what is his message (anti-IFOR, anti/pro Gov)?

6. Are signs or banners present, and if so, what is the message?

7. Is the media on site?; if so, identify who they represent.

8. Are there weapons present?

9. Who else is present at the location (local

police, IPTF, IFOR, Mayor, etc.)?

10. Are the demonstrators or rally participants from that location or from some where else?

11. How did the people know or hear about the gathering, rally or demonstration?

12. What are the peoples' stated objectives for the event?

TTP: The battle captain would collate the information provided by the staff and the brigades (through direct communications and the brigade liaison officer (LO)) in the following manner:

PRIORITY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

STAFF SECTIONS

PYSOP

1. How many people are present in the group or groups?
2. What is the gender makeup (male/female), age range; are there children present?
3. How are they moving (foot or vehicle)?
4. What is the general attitude of the people (violent or peaceful)?
5. Is there a key speaker, instigator or group representative, and, if so, what is his message (anti-IFOR, anti/pro Gov)?
6. Are signs or banners present, and, if so, what is the message?
7. Are media on site?; if so, identify who they represent?
8. Are weapons present?
9. Who else is present at the location (local police, IPTF, IFOR, Mayor, etc.)?
10. Are the demonstrators or rally participants from that location or from some where else?
11. How did the people know or hear about the gathering, rally or demonstration?
12. What are the peoples' stated objectives for the event?

BATTLE CAPTAIN

BATTLE CAPTAIN'S INCIDENT DRILL

INCIDENT: _____ DTG: _____ SECTION NAME: _____ LOCATION: _____

- ALERT TENT
- ALERT CMD GP: CG, ADM, CUS
- HIDE
- INTERCOM
- UPDATE BRANCH
- IDENTIFY OPT BRP
- TROOPS AVAILABLE - CG
- TROOPS AVAILABLE - IDENTIFY OPT BRP
- FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
- CG
- INTELLIGENCE
- RECONNAISSANCE
- TROOPS AVAILABLE - RECONNAISSANCE
- FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
- SIGINT
- RF/ONEC/ASST/AN
- AGZ
- AVAILABLE ASST/AN
- TROOPS AVAILABLE - AVAILABLE ASST/AN
- FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
- PD
- PFI/OL POLICE (RELEAS)
- RECONNAISSANCE (PFI/OL)
- TROOPS AVAILABLE - RECONNAISSANCE (PFI/OL)
- TROOPS AVAILABLE - RECONNAISSANCE (PFI/OL)
- OFFICIALS/ASST/AN
- FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
- JC
- SHOCK/ASST/AN
- TROOPS AVAILABLE - SHOCK/ASST/AN
- FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
- CA
- LOCAL MINOR/OL (PFI/OL)
- RECONNAISSANCE (PFI/OL)
- TROOPS AVAILABLE - RECONNAISSANCE (PFI/OL)
- OFFICIALS/ASST/AN
- FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
- PSOP
- RECONNAISSANCE
- EQUIPMENT/ASST/AN
- TROOPS AVAILABLE - EQUIPMENT/ASST/AN
- TROOPS AVAILABLE - EQUIPMENT/ASST/AN
- FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
- UPDATE TENT
- UPDATE CMD GP
- ★ CMD GP DECISION

NOTES: _____

BRIGADES

BRIGADE BATTLE CPT

- UPDATES ON SITUATION
- COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT
- COURSE(S) OF ACTION

BRIGADE LO

- TROOPS AVAILABLE
- CONTINGENCY PLANS



TTP: The TFE staff weighted the brigades with divisional assets to ensure adequate combat power was available to support the units on the ground. The aviation brigade was tasked to provide a AH-64 scout weapons team on a one-hour alert as the divisional reserve. The mission of the aircraft was force presence in areas of potential flashpoints, to provide gun-tape footage of the confrontation/demonstration and aerial escort of UH-60s. The AH-64s had to be equipped with the capability for transmittal of photos to the division main command post. In addition, one aircraft was required for transport of divisional or brigade command and control elements, combat camera crew, and military police elements; one UH-60 had to be configured with an aerial loudspeaker (ALS) from PSYOP; and two OH-58 aircraft were tasked to be prepared to conduct reconnaissance, provide an additional command and control capability, and conduct courier missions.

The authority to commit the aircraft rested with the Division Commander. Units would request the aircraft through the Division battle captain, for a decision by the command group. Requests had to provide sufficient detail to enable mission planning: to include pickup zones, location of the demonstration and landing zones, number of passengers, combat camera or aerial loud speaker requirements, time required on station, frequencies and callsigns, and location of friendly forces and International Police Task Force. The unit had to be prepared to provide an intelligence and operational update upon arrival of the aircraft. Upon arrival into the brigade airspace, the aircraft became under the operational control of the maneuver brigade that sent the request.

The Predator and other unmanned aerial vehicle assets were tasked to perform surveillance of the area. The Predator was particularly useful in documenting the event for use in Joint Commissions to demonstrate violations of the peace accord. In addition, the film could be analyzed to identify instigators of hostilities.

The Task Force Eagle staff set the conditions for the subordinate brigades by synchronizing resources available to the Division prior to, during, and after civil disturbances. These tactics, techniques, and procedures can be applied in any operation - - peace or war, but proved to be exceptional for the operational environment in the former Yugoslavia.🇺🇸





TASK FORCE EAGLE's Isolate, Dominate, maintain common situational Awareness, and employ Multi-dimensional, multi-echeloned actions (IDAM) STRATEGY FOR RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISTURBANCES

by MAJ Mark Dickens and CPT Rob Murphy, CALL Military Analysts

If recent history holds true, the future of the U.S. Army holds frequent deployments in support of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement operations. These operations inherently include the likelihood of encountering civil disturbances. Our success in handling these disturbances will have a decisive effect on our success in peace operations.

A poorly handled civil disturbance can quickly escalate out of control with potentially long-term negative effects for the mission — *our soldiers will be placed in more danger* both during the disturbance and afterward. Conversely, a well-handled situation can lead to both an enhanced view of the professionalism and strength of the U.S. Army and result in fewer disturbances in the future.

SITUATION:

During the late summer of 1996, there was an increase in the resettlement of civilians from all sides of the Former Warring Factions (FWFs) throughout contested sections of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As this resettlement took place, the Implementation Force (IFOR) experienced a dramatic rise in the number of incidents in which Muslim families left the Bosnia Federation, crossed the Zone of Separation (ZOS), and attempted to reinhabit their previous homes. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) ensures refugees the right to reinhabit previously owned homes.

In this Peace Enforcement operation, local officials and police were responsible for ensuring the safety of their citizens - including UNHCR-sponsored refugees. IFOR assists this process by providing general military security and by facilitating negotiations.

In Aug 96, the Republic Srpska Ministry of the Interior Police, armed with pistols and sticks, attempted to evict several Muslim families from houses in the town of Mahala. IFOR responded to the incident because it was a clear violation of the GFAP. IFOR separated the two groups and disarmed the Ministry of the Interior Police. Local radio stations began broadcasting messages encouraging locals to gather outside the International Police Task Force (IPTF) Headquarters in Zvornic to protest the actions of IFOR. A mob quickly formed.

They beat one IPTF officer and overturned and destroyed an IPTF vehicle parked in front of the station. The unruly mob surrounded the IPTF headquarters trapping the IPTF officers inside. Within a short time, the mob formed a convoy of approximately 250 personnel to move to Mahala to protest the actions of IFOR at the scene of the original incident. The situation was in danger of rapidly escalating out of control. Task Force Eagle (TFE) quickly implemented their strategy to quell the situation.



TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (TTP)

Having dealt with several civil disturbances throughout the area of operations during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, TFE had developed a strategy to successfully deal with this type situation. The techniques can be described using the acronym **IDAM**: **I**solate, **D**ominate, maintain Common Situational **A**wareness, and employ **M**ulti-dimensional, Multi-echeloned Actions.

Isolate in time and space the trouble spot from outside influence or interaction. The brigade responsible for the AOR quickly set up an inner ring of checkpoints around Mahala to limit and control access while Kiowa Warrior helicopters screened the flanks. The TFE commander sent AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopters to the area to perform two functions: overwatch nearby Jarda (a Republic Srpska Special Police weapons storage site) and provide a **VISIBLE** presence to deter outside elements from approaching Mahala.

Dominate the situation through force presence and control of information resources. The Brigade's overwhelming show of force at the checkpoints, coupled with the attack helicopter overflights, dissuaded entry into Mahala by potentially de-stabilizing elements. Predator and Pioneer UAV platforms, AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter, and OH-58 Kiowa Warrior helicopter overflights provided real-time situation reports - ensuring TFE units knew the "ground truth" at all times. This knowledge of ground truth gave TFE commanders a decisive advantage in both negotiations with potentially hostile elements in and around Mahala and in tactical maneuvers.

maintain common situational Awareness requires timely, accurate, complete, multi-source reporting. In the case of Mahala, TFE received reports from a broad spectrum of sources: brigade checkpoints around Mahala; Kiowa Warriors reported on movements in and around Mahala; AH-64s overwatching nearby Jarda; IPTF; and European Community Civil Monitors. In addition, TFE maintained area coverage with Predator and Pioneer UAV platforms. These reports were relayed to each unit involved in the operation, and each brigade in TFE was kept informed.

employ Multi-dimensional, multi-echeloned actions. While the Brigade handled local security at Mahala, TFE headquarters focused its efforts on the larger tactical and political spectrum. The TFE commander influenced the Minister of the Interior (Republic Srpska) and the Tuzla Canton Mayor (in which Mahala resides) to make telephone calls to Mahala and Zvornic. Both the Minister of the Interior and the Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (COMARRC) were flown to Mahala to personally influence the situation. Continuing to use all available resources to influence the outcome, TFE convinced local radio stations to stop making inflammatory broadcasts and begin making broadcasts designed to quell and disperse the crowds.

TFE's **IDAM** strategy worked quite effectively. Within hours, the situation was stabilized. The crowds dispersed peacefully, and order was restored outside the IPTF headquarters. No one was injured, and further destruction was kept to a minimum.☺

NOTE: For detailed information on Civil Disturbance, refer to CALL Newsletter No. 96-11, Nov 96, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Civil Disturbance, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.